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THE MYTH OF THE INNOCENT SPOUSE
JOHN S. BRADWAY*
Lawyers as a class, in attempting to provide an effective
administration of justice,' conservatively have tended to apply
established legal concepts to every problem. This attitude
has, to a large extent, precluded testing the desirability of
each rule of law by an inquiry as to its social usefulness. 2 In
this respect the legal profession seems to lag behind other
professional groups. The medical profession, particularly in
the public health field, collects statistics which show clearly
the success of present remedies and preventive routine ;3 if
any particular device is unsuccessful, the profession is put on
notice and something else may be substituted. The business
man constantly keeps check upon the viewpoint of the public
by numberless devices ranging from daily market quotations
and cost accounting systems to credit reports and complaint
departments. The lawyer, except for routine data gathered by
clerks of courts, reported decisions of courts, occasional bits
of testimony in litigation, the production of the legislative
mill and an infrequent book, newspaper or magazine article,
*Director, Legal Aid Clinic, Duke University. The writer wishes to
acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Harland Leathers of the Class of
1937 of the Duke University Law School for aid in the preparation of
the footnotes to this article. The material on page 378 of this article in
regard to the necessity of a continuous statistical scrutiny of rules of
law has been previously covered at length by the writer. Bradway, A
National Bar Survey, 16 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 662 (1936).
'Sir Frederick Pollock: "Remember that it is your office as lawyers
to give authentic form to the highest public morality of which you are
capable as citizens and that this office belongs of right no less to the
bar than to the bench." Quoted by Henry M. Bates, address of May 9,
1931, to Albany Law School in the Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics, p.
23. See also People v. MacCabe, 18 Col. 186, 32 Pac. 280, 281 (1893);
Am. Bar Ass'n Canons of Professional 'Ethics, #2; Jackson, The
Lawyer, Leader or Mouthpiece? 19 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 70 (1935); see
also Constitution of the American Bar Association, Article I: "Its
object shall be to advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the
administration of justice and uniformity of legislation, throughout the
Union, uphold the honor of the profession of the law, and encourage
cordial intercourse among the members of the American bar."2Marshall and May, The Divorce Court (1932) viii, speaking of the
statistical material available from court records: "These studies ob-
viously deal with no more than a fraction of the facts which it would
be necessary to know in order to discuss intelligently a 'reform' of the
judicial handling of divorce. In other words, the findings of fact in
these studies are a necessary but by no means sufficient basis in and
of themselves upon which to base possible reforms of our divorce law
and procedure."3See Peebles, A Survey of Statistical Data on Medical Facilities in
the United States, Committee on Costs of Medical Care, Bulletin #23(1929) 48. See also Statistical Abstract of the United States (1935)
80-94.
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has little statistical data to indicate the nature or the extent
of fluctuations in public confidence in a rule of law. Conse-
quently, each problem is solved in terms of some recognized
legal maxim, the social usefulness of which the bench or bar
has little chance of determining accurately. Public dissatis-
faction with the laws, much of it inarticulate, does exist.4 So
long as public confidence in the administration of justice is
desired, there is reason for placing every rule of law under a
comprehensive, continuous, sensitive, uniform statistical
scrutiny. Perhaps this need and a suggested remedy can best
be illustrated by a concrete examination of one "rule of law."
Broadly, the concept which we shall examine is known as
the doctrine of recrimination. This rule requires that the
plaintiff in a divorce proceeding be "innocent," if he is to
prevail. It is one device for expressing the policy of the law
against family disintegration and dissolution.5 Notoriously,
its use in the litigation process often makes necessary perjury
or collusion; in other words, litigants achieve a result which
they desire not because of the rule, but in spite of it. Figures
are lacking to show its effect in producing stable family life.
Its value to the public is assumed rather than tested. Under
a careful statistical scrutiny it should be possible to determine
whether or not such a rule is beneficial, or whether the legal
problems of modern families are of a sort to render it ob-
solete.
The defense of recrimination in a divorce proceeding bars
the plaintiff. 6 Lay approval of the doctrine may be gained by
applying it to a set of facts on behalf of a woman defendant
with several children, unable to provide for herself, where
the unfeeling husband-plaintiff is endeavoring to evade mari-
tal obligations on some trivial legal ground.7 But its applica-
4For example, see Laski, The Decline of the Professions, 171 Harpers'
676 (1935); Atwood, The Law Lags Behind, 50 Christian Century 523(1933).5See 2 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Rela-
tions (6th ed. 1921) §§ 1732-1771, 1922, and cases cited; Spencer v.
Spencer, 61 Fla. 777, 55 So. 71, 72 (1911). See also Perry v. Perry, 199
Iowa 685, 202 N. W. 572, 574 (1925), in which the court says: "Courts
must recognize that society has an interest in the permanency and
stability of the marriage relation and the severance of this relation
must not be decreed except for just cause . . ."
62 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation (1891) 174, § 364. For
a comprehensive treatment of recrimination in adultery cases, see Com-
ment, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 95 (1936).7See, for example, McDonald, Cruel and Inhuman Treatment as
Grounds for Divorce, 10 Marq. L. Rev. 215 (1925); Notes, 14 Boston
Univ. L. Rev. 172 (1934); 28 Mich. L. Rev. 937 (1930).
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tion is less appealing in a case where two individualistic
spouses, each capable of self support without the other, and
both guilty of breaches of domestic duty, find life together
intolerable. In an earlier day the court applied the rule in-
flexibly, and to justify it judges indulged in certain sociologi-
cal assumptions, such as, for example, that erring spouses
"are suitable and proper companions."" In one case this idea
was elaborated in the following language:
The doctrine.., has its foundation in reason and
propriety: It would be hard if a man could complain
of the breach of a contract which he has violated; if
he could complain of an injury when he is open to a
charge of the same nature. It is not unfit, if he who
is the guardian of the purity of his own house has
converted it into a brothel, that he should not be al-
lowed to complain of the pollution which he himself
has introduced; if he who has first violated his mar-
riage vow should be barred of his remedy. The par-
ties may live together and find sources of mutual for-
giveness in the humiliation of mutual guilt."
Such assumptions may simplify the application of the rule,
but, unless they are supported by the facts, they tend to bring
it into disrepute. Many persons today will disagree with the
conclusions of the court and will object that the rule, if tested,
not on the basis of its history, but solely on the arguments
advanced for and against it, is not socially useful. It is con-
venient to consider these tests. Examined on this basis the
rule throws considerable light upon our legal practices.
HISTORY OF THE RULE
The obvious argument in support of the rule is its vitality
for over two thousand years; one comes to think of it as some-
thing inevitably fundamental. It appeared in the Roman
law.10 The English ecclesiastical courts employed it down to
1857," when it came under the influence of the English chan-
8 Chancellor Walworth, in Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108, 111 (N. Y.
1830).9See Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Ecc. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. R. 755 (1799).
'oD.24.3.39.
"Originally domestic affairs were handled in England exclusively by
the ecclesiastical courts. 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English
Law (1923) 336. Since the church did not recognize divorce prior to
1857, absolute divorce in England was procurable only by a special act
of Parliament. The cost of such procedure was prohibitive. However,
separations e mensa et thoro were granted by ecclesiastical courts. 1
Colquhoun, Roman Civil Law (1849) 526, § 644; 10 Halsbury's Laws
of England (2d ed. 1933) 631, § 921. In actions for separation a mensa
et thoro, the defense of recrimination was clearly recognized. Forster v.
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cery courts and there continued until 1873.12 Due in large
measure to historical accidents, the American courts, deprived
of the cooperation of ecclesiastical tribunals'. and drawing
their inspiration from the English common law concepts, came
to apply it as one of the rules of equity. Legislatures and
courts in this country have accepted the rule almost unani-
mously. 14
Yet the historical survey is by no means conclusive as to
the perennial usefulness of the rule; there are notable excep-
tions. In the Roman law the rule was used largely with re-
gard to cases where property adjustments between the
spouses, rather than divorce, were in issue.15 Divorce'was a
matter of mutual consent. 16 In France'7 and in Scotland 8 at
Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. R. 504 (1790); Beeby v. Beeby,
supra note 9; Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. R.
747 (1819).
12The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c. 85) con-
solidated matrimonial matters with the rest of the English judicial
system and introduced a departure from the conventional concept of
recrimination by leaving it within the discretion of the judge whether
or not a divorce would be granted when the defense was recriminatory.
See Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, supra, §§ 2, 3, 6. The Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1857 was supplemented by the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture (Consolidation) Act of 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. V., c. 49) but left the
rule as to recrimination unchanged.
Apparently, the transfer from the ecclesiastical courts to the courts
of law and equity was not accomplished without a corresponding loss of
interest in the human problems which the spiritual courts find in do-
mestic causes. Carter, A History of the English Courts (5th ed. 1927)
146.
IsSince at the time of the separation of the colonies from Great
Britain divorce was a matter for the ecclesiastical courts, and since
ecclesiastical courts were never established in the colonies, for some
time the law was not administered for want of a tribunal. Burtis v.
Burtis, 1 Hopkins 557 (N. Y. 1825). Divorce jurisdiction was conferred
by statute in the United States usually to courts of Equity or Probate
courts. See 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1931) 98, § 81. How-
ever, the doctrine of recrimination seems firmly imbedded in both
statute and decision. See Note, 26 Col. L. Rev. 83 (1926).
142 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 82, § 78.
15D.24.3.39; see Note, 13 Ore. L. Rev. 335 (1934). As an indication
that the doctrine of recrimination was originally considered primarily
in connection with property rights, see Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con.
292, 297, 161 Eng. Rep. R. 747, 749 (1819): "It was a doctrine not
peculiar to the common law that it looked with disfavor to a com-
plaining party who was himself offender in the same way, for the civil
law certainly did the same to the extent of not barring the wife's
demand for dower against such a husband."
Property settlements such as dower were an important consideration
in English divorces, even while controlled by ecclesiastics. See 2 Holds-
worth, A History of English Law (1928) 394.
101 Westermark, The History of Human Marriage (1925) 321, et seq.
1"It is laid down broadly that the doctrine of recrimination was not
recognized as a part of the civil law as applied in France. Planiol et
Ripert, Droit Civil I (Ile 6d. 1928) no 1205, p. 409.
'
8 Although the doctrine of recrimination may formerly have been
applied in Scotland, it is now repudiated. Erskine, Principles of the
Law of Scotland (1911) 77.
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certain periods the rule was definitely repudiated. In Eng-
land, since 1857, it has been replaced by a discretion vested
in the court. 9 Modern Russia20 and Japan2' offer examples
of legal systems in which the State makes little effort to limit
free divorce when the parties desire it.
Even where the rule is applied in this country, situations
have induced the courts to seek a more equitable principle.
The doctrine of comparative rectitude22 and the theory2 re-
quiring that the offense relied upon for recrimination be
either the same as, or equally as serious as, the one charged
against the defendant, have found supporters. But recrimina-
tion is firmly entrenched in legal thinking in the United
States24 and will require a more fundamental analysis of the
reasons for and against it.
REASONS FOR THE RULE
Modern courts are inclined to justify the rule on certain well
recognized equity grounds. Ordinarily the judicial language
will contain a reference to the maxim: "He who comes into
19Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § 3).
See 10 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1933) 690, § 1022:
".. . when the guilty (of adultery) petitioner is the husband and the
Court is convinced of his bona fides it may consider: (1) the position
and interests of his children; (2) the interest of the woman with whom
he has misconducted himself ... ; (3) the fact that the withholding of a
decree would not be likely to reconcile husband and wife; and (4) the
interest of the husband, that he might remarry and lead a respectable
life." See also 10 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1933) 691,
§ 1026: "In suits for dissolution of marriage, the court may in its dis-
cretion, grant or refuse a decree to a husband so guilty."20Freund, Civil Law of the Soviet Union, 22 Ill. L. Rev. 699, 702
(1928).
213 'Westermark, op. cit. supra note 16, at p. 304 et seq.22Keezer, Marriage and Divorce (1923) 303, n. 96; 2 Bishop, Marriage,
Divorce and Separation (1891) 170 et seq.; McIntosh, Recrimination:
Doctrine of Comparative Rectitude, 34 Law Notes (Am.) 145 (1930);
Notes, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 94 (1929); 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1929); 18
Iowa L. Rev. 391 (1933.).23Some courts hold that recrimination may only be based upon the
commission by the plaintiff of an act similar to that relied on for di-
vorce. Bancroft v. Bancroft, 27 Del. 9, 85 Atl. 561 (1911) (adultery,
cruelty no bar); Dillon v. Dillon, 32 La. Ann. 643 (1880) (extreme
cruelty and attempt to kill, ill temper no bar); Staples v. Staples, 136
S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (cruelty, extravagance no bar).
Other courts say that grounds for limited divorce do not bar an action
for absolute divorce. Griffin v. Griffin, 23 How. Pr. 183 (N. Y. 1862);
Appeltofft v. Appeltofft, 147 Md. 603, 128 Atl. 273 (1925); Notes, 26
Col. L. Rev. 83 (1926); 15 Iowa L. Rev. 498 (1930).
242 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at pp. 82, 379, §§ 78, 121; 2
Schouler, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 1721-1729; Tiffany, Persons and
Domestic Relations (2d ed. 1909) 221, § 109; Notes, 17 Minn. L. Rev.
663 (1933); 25 Ill. L. Rev. 459 (1930); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 232 (1930);
15 St. L. L. Rev. 280 (1930).
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Equity must come with clean hands." 25  Yet it should be re-
membered that historically the ecclesiastical 6 and not the
chancery courts had control over the proceedings which led
up to divorce by Act of Parliament, and, therefore, that in the
transfer from ecclesiastical to equitable principles something
may have been lost. Another ground frequently advanced is
the well known rule applicable to commercial contracts that
one who has himself breached a contract cannot complain of
another's breach.2 7  Yet the courts, when occasion offered,
have been quite ready to distinguish the marriage contract
from the commercial contract. The language of the courts
indicates that in applying or releasing these rules they regard
them merely as legal formulae expressing the courts' concept
of social justice.28
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RULE
The first argument against the rule relates to the lack of
uniformity in the subject matter. In general, a rule of law is
designed to deal with a recurring situation amid certain sur-
roundings. If the situation or the surroundings change, the
rule is out of focus. A continuous statistical survey would
indicate such changes and the consequent distortion of the
rule. It is well recognized that the family, as a social or-
ganism (the subject of the instant rule), has undergone sub-
stantial readjustments. The term "family" has been used to
describe a certain relationship but viewed as an economic
unit, the family has ranged from a close knit, self regimented
unit to a loosely bound group of individuals. The Roman
family experienced substantial modifications. At the begin-
ning of the historical era it was patriarchal 29 -a state within
25Cf. Stoneburner v. Stoneburner, 11 Idaho 603, 83 Pac. 938 (1905);
Day v. Day, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905); Smith v. Smith, 781 Ky.
55, 203 S. W. 884 (1918); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211
Pac. 916 (1923).
2 See supra note 11.27See Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 254 (1858) ; Tillison v. Tillison,
63 Vt. 411, 22 Atl. 531, 532 (1891); Richardson v. Richardson, 114
N. Y. S. 912, 917 (1906).
28"That rule (recrimination), as applied to divorce, means that it is
a remedy provided for the innocent and injured party and if the evi-
dence discloses that both have shown grounds for divorce, neither is
entitled to it. It must be conceded, however, that there is a growing
tendency in divorce cases to at times relax that rule on grounds of
public policy or the peculiar exigencies of the special case under con-
sideration and adopt one of comparative rectitude or turpitude." See
Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 437, 140 N. W. 587, 589 (1913). See
also Rolfsen v. Rolfsen, 130 Ky. 395, 115 S. W. 213 (1909); Staples v.
Staples, supra note 23.
29Jacobs, Cases and Materials on Domestic Relations (1933) 3.
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itself, the pater familias its legal, religious and political ruler.
The home was the center of industry and the group largely
self sustaining. The family asserted its right to supervision
over marriage and divorce as against the State which had
only limited powers; divorce was almost unknown. But by
the beginning of the Christian era divorce was a national
scandal, the family ties were of the loosest sort and a rule
of recrimination was applied in property transactions.3 0
The medieval family, on the other hand, beginning with the
early Christians and continuing for over a thousand years, de-
veloped increasing unity and self discipline.31 No divorce
was available, but domestic difficulties and annulment were
administered by the church as spiritual, as well as temporal
matters; probably there has never been a stronger family
unit than that in the later middle ages. Inevitably, there was
a reaction. The Protestant movement encouraged the idea of
individualism;32 ecclesiastical control over domestic matters
gradually relaxed in favor of the State.38 In England3 ' the re-
laxation of the family ties was more uniform than in this
country where frontier conditions for a long time required a
highly effective social organism. 5
Today there is within the family itself a conflict of interest
between individual desires, and what the State may think is
best for the family.38 Until that conflict is resolved on the
basis of a comprehensive and continuous factual survey, it
may well be argued that the rule requiring an innocent plain-
tiff is not socially effective.
The second argument against the rule raises the cynical
question whether there are in fact any innocent spouses. New
legal diagnostic machinery is necessary to determine the facts
3OFrequent references have been made to the instability of the Roman
family at this period. For example, see 31 Westermark, op. cit. supra
note 16, at p. 329: "Almost all the well known ladies of the Ciceronian
age were divorced at least once and Seneca said that some women
counted their years, not by consuls, but by their husbands." See also
1 Colquhoun, op. cit. supra note 11, at p. 532.31Goodsell, The Family as a Social and Educational Institution (1930)
207.
-2See, for example, Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce
(Preface) 16, 17; De Pomerai, Marriage (1930) 203 et seq.33See Lichtenberger, Divorce (1931) 98.34See Goodsell, op. cit. supra note 31, at p. 296 et seq.35See 1 Calhoun, Social History of the American Family (1917) cc.
4, 9.36See Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology (H. G. and Cary
Baynes' Tr., 1928) 189; Odlum, Some Psychological Factors in Mar-
riage, 2 Marriage Hygiene 30 (1935).
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but as matters stand a fair case may be made out that the
innocent spouse is rapidly becoming a myth.
There are two processes by which such innocence is de-
termined. In the legislative provisions of each State dealing
with divorce there is enumerated a list of acts the commis-
sion of which by one spouse is ground for relief of the other.
These same acts, if proved against the plaintiff, mark him a
guilty spouse. So the more grounds there are for divorce, the
fewer are the potentially innocent spouses. Where separation
for a period is grounds for divorce there are cases holding
that either party may ask relief 7 In such a situation guilt is
no longer important. Where mental cruelty is a ground for
divorce, any person who has been married for a year or
longer has probably as a matter of fact passed out of the
circle of innocent spouses.
In the courts the number is further reduced. Where the
case is not contested, the judge, unless he has unusually ef-
fective means of investigating the facts and a desire to secure
them, does not raise the defense. 38 Even when it is raised
it must be proved as a technical matter.3 9 There are cases
where evidence is not available, and others where the de-
fendant does not care, for reasons of his own, to press the
issue. Where legislature and litigants unite to make divorce
easier, it is difficult for the court alone, without adequate
machinery, to sustain the burden of a traditional, social
philosophy. An occasion is presented for gathering the facts
and re-evaluating the legal processes.
A third argument against the rule is that the community
sanctions which are necessary to sustain it are relaxed. The
3 7Hurry v. Hurry, 141 La. 956, 76 So. 160 (1917); Phillips v. Phillips,
22 Wis. 246 (1867); Cole v. Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1871); Daugherty v.
Daugherty, 198 S. W. 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); and see Cook v. Cook,
164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178 (1913).
See also Feinsinger, Observations on Judicial Administration of Di-
vorce Laws in Wisconsin, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 27 (1932).38"As far as the severance of the marital bond is concerned the first
volume of this study has indicated that the battle of the divorce court
is in the main cinema warfare. The smoke and the noise are all parts
of the picture conventionalized by many centuries of tradition; and aside
from the controversies on incidental matters such as property, alimony
or support money, there is not often a real contest before the court."
1 Marshall and May, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 11.39In Carmichael v. Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211 Pac. 916, 918(1923), the court quotes from 2 Schouler, op. cit. supra note 5, at §
1701: "'It is a general principle, applicable to all divorce proceedings,
that the spouse petitioning must have been ... clear of blame. By clear
of blame, we mean (1) without substantial fault in causing the offense
complained of, and, furthermore (2) free from other misconduct equally
reprehensible under the divorce laws.'
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family is no longer a compelling factor. The church does not
exert its former influence in temporal affairs.40 Marriage
is now a contract rather than a sacrament.41 Penalties for
breach of marriage vows today are property considerations,
money damages, alimony, deprivation of the right of con-
sortium ;42 at one time, they were spiritual-penance, excom-
munication.4 3 Neighbors and friends are less puritanical in
their social ostracism of divorced persons 44 and they use their
own judgment rather than the decision of the court in deter-
mining with which spouse their sympathies shall go. Socio-
logists urge that of the many social and economic bonds which
in pioneer days held the American family together, only two
today are important-mutual affection and the responsibility
for the raising of children.
45
Legal machinery is needed in such a case to measure public
opinion. If the facts sustain the assumption that the public
has little interest in the sanctions back of the rule, two al-
ternatives are open: to attempt to re-awaken those sanctions,
or to set up a new rule more in line with modern thought. It
is probably easier to set up a new rule along the line of least
resistance.
A fourth argument against the rule urges that it is a sign
post directing the public, the court and the parties to a side
issue instead of to the main issue. The rule is now employed
in a litigation process where one party seeks redress from the
other. Not infrequently the defense of recrimination is used
to further the malice or greed of the individual defendant. 46
Under such circumstances the public purpose of restraining
the disintegration and dissolution of the family finds little
opportunity for expression. There is reason to argue that the
respective interests of the State and the litigant in the out-
4 0Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? (1928) 1.41See Deitzman v. Mullen, 108 Ky. 610, 57 S. W. 247 (1900).
42See, generally, 2 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at pp. 283-325,
§§ 107-111.
43Cf. Shelford, Marriage and Divorce (1841) 177.44See 3 Calhoun, op. cit. supra note 35, at p. 266. "A man that for-
mally broke up his family or a woman that formally deserted her hus-
band had to take into account the antagonism of the neighborhood and
the bitterness of its frown. City life is a great solvent of custom;
neighbors do not know each other, or if they do, they are tolerant, or
the problem may be solved by moving. Hence one is free to follow fancy
in matters of divorce." Id.45Jacobs and Angell, Research in Family Law (1930) 37-38.
46For example, see Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587
(1913) (in which custody and support of children was the bone of
contention); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 9 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9 (1929).
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come of the case should be disentangled. Confused issues re-
sult in a justifiable basis for popular complaint. Because the
family occupies a different place in the community; because in
many States, on account of the liberality of the divorce laws,
there are potentially no innocent spouses after the parties
have lived together for a year; because the community sanc-
tions sustaining it are relaxed; because there is no adequate
administrative machinery; the existence of the rule today is
due more to uncritical inertia, than to its public utility.
The foregoing arguments against the rule are unsatisfac-
tory in that they are not supported by factual data. Interest-
ing, but not conclusive, facts are available in the records of
legal aid societies, 47 social service agencies,48 domestic rela-
tions courts;49 the data from the divorce courts themselves
are disappointing." In spite of the labor and expense involved
47See the detailed statistics showing the source, nature and disposition
of cases handled by the Legal Aid Societies of the country and published
annually by the National Association of Legal Aid Organizations.48For material on the subject of statistics of social agencies, see,
generally, Berry and Buell, The Statistical Base for Community Plan-
ning, 62 Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work 424. As
to statistics of Family Welfare Agencies, see, for example, Marcus,
Case Work Interpretation: An Area of Professional Exploration, 17
The Family 169 (1936); A Study of 229 Cases Referred to Family Case
Work Agencies by the Court of Domestic Relations of Brooklyn, 17 The
Family 81 (1936).
49The records kept by domestic relations courts have hitherto been
scanty. It has been recommended: "Every court should have a record
system which provides for the necessary legal records and for social
records covering the investigation of the case, and the work accom-
plished. The records of investigation should include all the facts neces-
sary to a constructive plan of treatment. The records of supervision
should show the constructive case work plan attempted and accomplished
and should give a chronological history of the supervisory work." United
States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin #193 (1929)
45. The authors hasten to add: "In the majority of the courts included
in this study the social records did not meet the standard specified in
either juvenile or adult cases. The records of supervision were as a
rule less complete than the records of investigation." Id.5oStatutes requiring the keeping of a centralized record of all divorces
are designed to aid in the accumulation of such data and also to give
the parties a convenient way of proving the divorce just as birth and
marriage certificates afford convenient means of proof of these im-
portant matters. Such statutes are found in fifteen states. They all
follow a similar pattern requiring a local official, usually the clerk of
the divorce court, to make a monthly or annual return to the state
officer in charge of vital statistics giving the facts required by statute.
For a summary of these statutes, see 2 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at
p. 326, §112.
In a recent survey, conducted by the author, as to the statistical data
available regarding domestic problems in the court records in North
Carolina, the material for which is as yet unpublished, it appeared that
the only information available about the cases was the names of the
parties involved, nature of the charge and the disposition of the case
by the court. Unless the observer goes directly to the warrant issued,
there is no way of telling whether the case is in the domestic field or
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in accumulating statistics, the very inadequacy of the present
information stands as a challenge to the lawyer who feels that
the legal profession should know everything that takes place
in its own field. The balancing of the interests of the in-
dividual litigant and the welfare of the family, as. seen
through the eyes of the State, awaits the facts.
THE THEORY OF A REMEDY
The problem of the disintegrating family invites a solution
more complex than the substitution of a single new or im-
proved rule of law. Among the matters calling for attention
are: (1) the establishment and maintenance of a process of
legal diagnosis for disentangling the various interests in-
volved in. a domestic case; (2) a clarification of the public
interest in marriage and the family; (3) a device for the con-
tinuous collection of statistical data.
Law is administered through four types of process: civil,
criminal, equitable and miscellaneous. Disbarment proceed-
ings fall into the fourth group as would the procedure in
Ecclesiastical courts if such existed in this country. Because
certain traditionally ecclesiastical procedures dealing with
domestic relations were needed in the American colonies, they
were more or less arbitrarily adopted as part of the equitable
process. This historical accident tended to conceal their real
nature and thus confuse litigants. Originally, they were de-
vices for sustaining the contact between the church and the
sacrament of the individual marriage. In civil law they be-
came the means by which the State declared the end of a
status. The interest of the church and later of the State in
the family bulked large. Litigants, thinking as individuals
along lines of contentious equitable proceedings, have tended
to lose sight of the significance of the presence of the State as
a party in the marriage contract. They see divorce not as a
solemn impersonal decree of death for a socially useless
family, but as a battle in which one individual victorious
spouse gains the right to remarry and perhaps a substantial
property settlement. The confusion would be somewhat the
exclusively in the field of criminal law. The various magistrates, having
probable cause jurisdiction over a number of these problems, estimate
that from sixty to ninety per cent of the warrants issued are allowed
to be withdrawn upon the payment of costs by the prosecuting witness.(There is no record of these cases except the cancelled warrant). No
social investigations prior to or after trial are indicated except uponinquiries made to said agencies that had previous contacts with the
family and which are no part of the court records.
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same if civil claims were to be intermingled with criminal
processes.
If a difficulty arises in a modern American family, there
is an effort at self diagnosis. In some cases the circumstances
constitute a statutory ground for divorce, such as adultery or
cruelty, although the subject matter of the quarrel may be
damages in tort or contract. The complaining spouse, think-
ing in terms of the popular solution, may demand a divorce,
a remedy in which the State has an interest, although the
injury, as between the parties, is one in which adequate
money reimbursement may be made. There is a property
element in domestic affairs. It needs expression in the law.
There are cases where damages rather than divorce will ade-
quately express the policy of the law. Where the whole matter
comes to the court in the form of a divorce case with requests
for alimony, disposition of children, as well as property set-
tlements or support, the interests of the State in the family
and the individual in his own concerns are tangled. The court
could do much useful work if it had authority to separate the
property problems and decide them apart from the question
of dissolution of the family.51 In the property aspects of di-
vorce recrimination is more useful than in the personal as-
pects because it relates more closely to the individual than to
the family. To grant a divorce where money damages are
legally adequate is an encroachment by civil process upon
a separate field. Such practice confuses the public and may
encourage divorce by placing the wrong goal before the
plaintiff.
In other cases the circumstances may amount to a statutory
ground for divorce, such as adultery or desertion, although
the subject matter of the quarrel is a criminal offense. The
complaining spouse, thinking in terms of a litigation process
which will give him an individual satisfaction, may demand a
divorce, which is a remedy in which the public has an interest,
although the public injury is to the State and a civil action for
damages would redress the personal injury.
51At common law husband and wife were considered legally one per-
son, so that no action could be maintained between them. Thus divorce
was the wife's only remedy in cases not giving rise to criminal action.
In many States today the disabilities as between spouses are removed
by statute or judicial decision. See 3 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at
p. 268, §180. Such a changed condition would seem to call for a new
analysis of the divorce problem and a revision of the law to meet the
new conditions.
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There is a criminal element in domestic affairs which
needs expression in the law. There are cases where a criminal
penalty rather than divorce will adequately express the policy
of the law. Where the untangled threads of such a proceeding
are before the court, it could render useful service if it had
power to separate the criminal element and dispose of it apart
from the question of the dissolution of the family. Divorce is
a device for expressing the interest of the State in the family
as a social unit, while in criminal matters the concern is with
the individual offender.
The first step toward reform is to disentangle divorce as a
device for keeping the State in touch with the family from
civil, criminal and equitable proceedings where the interest of
the individual litigant is paramount. The next step is to
clarify the public interest in this miscellaneous process.
From the standpoint of the State, there is one fundamental
problem in a divorce proceeding-shall the family be broken
up? All the other matters involving individual rights, prop-
erty settlements, custody of children, and the like, are inci-
dental thereto. The issues in this proceeding are not property
damage or punishment. In an earlier day the church con-
sidered these issues in the light of sin; they were spiritual
matters.5 2 Today, when the State rather than the church con-
trols, the problems remain much the same though the nomen-
clature is different. The legislature has declared certain
causes for divorce. The medical profession, the social work-
ers, the psychiatrists, dealing with families, report that the
legislative "causes" of divorce are only symptoms; that the
real causes are such matters as unemployment, ill health, lack
of self control, jealousy, selfishness. 3 The litigation process,
devised in a day when the "water-tight compartment" theory
of the social sciences54 prevented effective cooperation among
neighboring professional groups, serves fairly well to disclose
symptoms-what the defendant did; it is unable to cope with
the real causes. Litigation, a substitute for trial by battle,55
52Carter, op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 146, n.53See, for example, Popenoe, The Conservation of the Family (1926)
47-137; Schmalhausen, Family Life, a Study in Pathology, The New
Generation (1930) 275.
54Pound, Preventive Justice and Social Work, Proceedings of 1923
Conference of Social Work (1923) 151, 152.
55Legal scholars have long insisted upon the symbolic character of
our litigation processes, the trial representing a quarrel concerning the
thing at litigation with the judge as an umpire between the contestants.
In this picture the attorney is seen as analogous to the champion in the
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provides an arena in which contending parties can settle
claims of right and wrong. To employ this crude device,
which in a proper case will lead to family dissolution at the
request of one of the parties, as a means toward the rehabilita-
tion of a domestic unit already shaken by dissension, is some-
what like taking a watch to be repaired by a blacksmith. A
more sensitive institution is needed to deal with what are now
legal imponderables.
The initial questions for the court in a divorce case should
be, not only what the parties want, but what is for the best
interests of the family. Some families when they come into
court are already sociologically dead. As to them, the court,
in the interests of legal science, may perform a judicial au-
topsy. Others are dying. As to them, treatment should be
provided so that no individual may suffer unduly. There may
be communicable or contagious situations in which legal quar-
antine should be employed. If the family is merely ill, highly
individualized treatment and rehabilitation should be pro-
vided. The law should not be limited to the alternatives of
divorce or a dismissal of the case. At present the resources
of the law provide only for restraining persons and their prop-
erty.56 A better plan would be to bring to bear upon the
family and its members the preventive and remedial resources
of the entire community. This will require some exploration
in interstitial professional areas and the construction of ap-
propriate machinery.
Much of this proposal is not novel. Already several divorce
courts have set up special departments for the investigation
of facts-in England, the King's Proctor/7 and in the United
States, various public officials "58 and some private agencies.59
earlier trial by battle. See Maine, Early History of Institutions (1888)
253. These processes have been variously criticized. See Sunderland,
A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights, The Declaratory Judgment,
16 Mich. L. Rev. 69, 76 (1917); Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate
Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 142 (1927).
56"The historical and analytical jurisprudence of the last century
sought to exclude all social and economic problems as such from the
domain of the science of law. They sought to set up a self-sufficient
jurisprudence in which only authoritative legal matters, regarded as
such, should come into consideration." Pound, Social and Economic
Problems of the Law, 136 Annals 1 (1920).
5'7 The King's Proctor is a well established figure in actions involving
matrimonial affairs in the English Courts. See 10 Halsbury's Laws of
England (2d ed. 1933) 768, § 122 et seq.
58For a historical summary of the duties of the English Proctor and
a table of statutes in the United States establishing a lay functionary,
see 2 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 92, § 80.
59See Note, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 1090 (1926).
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Their specific function is the investigation not of the sociologi-
cal health of the family, but as to whether there is collusion."0
A second group of agencies which have made progress are
the domestic relations courts.6 1 They offer an inquisitorial
procedure 2 in addition to litigation, and specialized bureaus
and clinics for the treatment of specific problems . 6  Their
limitations are, in general, inability to grant divorces,6 ' in-
ferior jurisdiction, e5 lack of facilities for statistical analysis
of their records,"6 and the fact that ordinarily service is ren-
dered only to poor persons. 7 Perhaps because divorce is seen
more as a property than as a sociological or spiritual problem,
the divorce courts hold aloof from such experimentation.
A third set of agencies operates in the field. These are
widely separated in form and manner of service: for example,
'oA conservative account of the divorce situation in Nevada is given
by Ingram and Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada,
2 Law and Contemporary Problems 302 (1935). The publicity features
of this business are expanded upon by Bergerson, The Divorce Mill
Advertises, 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 348 (1935). For a
brief account of collusion in England, see Note, 8 Rocky Mountain L.
Rev. 160 (1936). See also Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 638 (1933).
61See bibliography on Family Courts in United States Department of
Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin #193 (1929) 71, Appendix B; see
also 3 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 139, § 163.
62"It is apparent that the court in its new procedure is combining
three distinct acts. It not only determines the facts, it seeks them out,
and it may itself apply the treatment indicated. It unites the judicial
process of the judge with the process of the grand jury, of the posse,
and of the district attorney, and it continues administrative supervision."
United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin #193
(1929) 19.03See North, The Family Court, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 174 (1935), dealing
with the family court in Wisconsin. This court includes a department
of domestic conciliation consisting of a director and the requisite number
of office workers whose duties are those of consultants as well as of
regular probation staff for supervisory work and pre-court investiga-
tion. In addition to these officers it seems probable that a medical ad-
visor would often be most useful. See also the recommendations in
United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin #193
(1929) 13 et seq. The usefulness of the recommendations in this
pamphlet seems lessened by reason of the assumption of the authors that
the rigidity of substantive divorce law precluded procedural modifica-
tion. See also Cooper and Dawson, Office of the Friend of the Court:
Its Function in Divorce Proceedings, 6 Detroit L. Rev. 23 (1935).
6"Jurisdiction to grant absolute divorce is conferred upon family or
domestic relations courts in only three States. See 2 Vernier, op. cit.
supra note 13, at p. 98, § 81.6 5 The family and domestic relations courts as established in the United
States are usually courts of original and inferior jurisdiction. See 3
Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 139, § 163.6 6See Elson, Divorce-A Study in Cooperation Between Family Wel-
fare Agencies and Legal Aid Bureaus, Bulletin #35, Ntl. Ass'n. of Legal
Aid Organizations (1934).6 7See 5 Encyc. of Soc. Sci. 197 (1931). "But beyond this dilemma
is the fact that by long association the domestic relations court in the
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social service agencies, newspaper advice to the lovelorn col-
umns, special radio broadcasts, specialized magazines, matri-
monial advice bureaus, eugenics and birth control clinics.
These indicate something of the public interest in the problem.
The proposed remedy requires a further development of these
agencies, a closer coordination, a set of tests, and a device for
gathering statistics.
THE PRACTICAL REMEDY
Practical machinery to accomplish the results suggested in-
cludes three steps: legislative, administrative, and educational.
The initial legislative step is the creation of a specialized court
which shall have authority to deal with all family problems.6 8
In some jurisdictions this result can be accomplished by com-
bining the work of an existing domestic relations court, and
the court that grants divorces. Elsewhere new powers must
be granted the existing divorce court. The multiplicity of
courts in this country negatives the idea of a new one.6 9 The
court, in dealing with the family, should have authority to per-
form the following functions. First, the court should in-
vestigate, diagnose and analyze the problems of the family
and allocate them for solution to such departments of the
court, or of the rest of the judicial system as are best qualified
to handle that type of problem. Tort and contract cases might
be disposed of by civil suit, and criminal matters by criminal
process, just as if the parties were not married. The problem
of divorce, however, and the rehabilitation of the family should
receive special consideration. Second, the court should con-
trol the persons and property of the members of the family
pending the investigation and the subsequent treatment. The
analogy in property matters would be to bankruptcy proce-
dure ;70 in matters of control of the person of the individual
large cities has practically come to signify a desertions court for the
poor (and often the alien poor) . . ." Id.
68See Report of the Joint Committee on Domestic Relations Courts,
Annual Report and Proceedings of 21st Annual Conference of the
National Probation Association (1927) 257; Zunser, Family Desertion
(Report on a Study of 423 Cases ), 145 Annals 98 (1929). For a set
of standards dealing with the erection of a domestic relations court,
see United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin
#193 (1929) 15-17.69Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929) 254-263.
70ONine States have already by statute given a deserted wife power
under court supervision to manage, sell and encumber the property of
the absent husband for the support of the wife and children. See 2
Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 492, § 143; Note 29 Col. L. Rev.
669 (1929).
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member of the family, to the material witness,1 for as long
as the family is the object of judicial consideration, the mem-
bers of the family are necessarily material witnesses.
The second legislative project should be a declaration that
divorce is no longer a matter of individual right, but purely
of judicial discretion to be granted in the light of all the cir-
cumstances of the case.72 The statute should do away with
all specific causes of divorce and announce that each case must
stand on its own merits, the question for judicial determina-
tion being: is the family any longer a useful, living, sociologi-
cal entity, or capable of rehabilitation?
Administrative steps to be taken relate to the setting up
of an appropriate department of the court which shall deal
with the spiritual and sociological problems of the marital
status in somewhat the same fashion as the ecclesiastical es-
tablishment of an earlier day functioned. Such an administra-
tive agency will require a staff of highly specialized experts,
or such close contacts with other agencies in the community
that the required service may be secured when needed. From
this specialized department, and through its contacts, will
come opinions of experts on the facts of the case, the desired
treatment, and other matters. A question may be raised as
to the degree of recognition to be accorded by the court to
such opinions. The analogy to the matter of expert testimony
has been noted.73
The third step is a change in viewpoint through education.
There are three objectives to be sought here. The first is the
evolution of a principle of law in which the welfare of the fam-
ily, as such, has a place. The ideal of what is for the best inter-
ests of the child is already accepted by juvenile courts as a
guiding principle.74  Under this theory questions of fact and
714 Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence (1905) 2959-2976, §§ 2190-2197.
72 There seems to be no fundamental reason why one would expect
greater wisdom in the legislative than in the judicial department of
government. The opportunities of checking abuse of judicial discretion
are far simpler and less expensive than those involved in remedying
legislative defects. Since the facts of each marriage are distinguishable
from the facts of every other marriage, the task of laying down fun-
damental principles in a legislative enactment is bound to be unsatisfac-
tory. Because the process of individualizing legal treatment has already
advanced substantially in the fields of criminal and juvenile court law,
there is reason to assume that similar advance will be made in the
field of domestic relations if the machinery is given a chance.73See supra note 71. Cf. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 56 (1901).74Tiffany, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 1921) 343 et seq.; Note 16 Ky.
L. Jour. 66 (1927).
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opinions of experts are received and dealt with.75 In the pres-
ent case, the doctrine of what is best for the family may well
be fully- as important as the desires of the individual mem-
bers.7 1 What is best in a particular case will depend upon
the facts, the recommendations of the experts, and the shrewd
discretion of the court, but unless this agency is staffed by
judges who view sympathetically the experiment recommended
here, it will fail. The machinery for providing such educa-
tion lies in the law schools and the schools of social work.
A department of Domestic Relations in the law schoo7 7 with
opportunity for graduate study in sociology, criminology, and
field work in legal aid societies or social case working agen-
cies, should produce lawyers and judges who have an adequate
understanding of the law and experience in social work tech-
niques. Special education of this sort is essential because a
lawyer, accustomed to the definite certainty of a legal matter
concluded by court decree, contract, release, or other legal
process, feels ill at ease in the presence of less obvious social
work techniques. There is a tendency to overrate the effec-
tiveness of one's own field and underrate that of a neighbor.
With this background one might expect the court to look upon
the family the way a physician looks at his patient, the way
a probation or parole officer looks at a person accused of
'crime, the way a juvenile court worker looks at a child. The
family has gone sociologically bankrupt, has evidenced its in-
ability to run itself, has fallen below a reasonable standard of
conduct. The unsolved problem of the domestic relations law
is family rehabilitation, not the assertion of individual
rights.78
75See Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States (1927) cc. 5, 6. See
also bibliography in United States Department of Labor, Children's
Bureau, Bulletin #193 (1929) 72, Appendix B.
76See Goodsell, op. cit. supra note 31, at p. 457.
77That domestic relations receive scant attention in most law school
curricula is shown by the analysis of typical law school bulletins:
Total of Property
Undergrad. and Criminal Domestic
Law School Courses Business Law Relations
University of California..... 30 18 1 0
University of Chicago ....... 49 33 2 1
Columbia University ......... 42 20 1 1
Duke University ............. 52 25 2 2
Harvard University .......... 34 19 1 1
University of Illinois ......... 57 31 3 1
University of Michigan ...... 43 26 1 1
Tulane University ........... 30 19 1 1
Yale University ............. 45 29 1 17 5As an example of the conflict in viewpoint, see Llewellyn, Behind
the Law of Divorce (II), 33 Col. L. Rev. 249, 250 (1933).
"The battle over divorce is a joining of issue between those who see
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A second item to be brought about by education should be
the collection of complete continuous vital statistics as to the
family. The law has lagged behind the medical profession
in the gathering of adequate statistics as to the human prob-
lems with which the law must deal. Here is an unique oppor-
tunity to obtain a statistical motion picture of family dissolu-
tion in the most realistic terms. The medical profession uses
its patients as a basis for scientific study. Even an autopsy
may reveal facts and confirm theories. Medical societies de-
vote a portion of their time to consideration of such material.
If the court records and material from law offices were suf-
ficiently detailed to provide the data, bar associations might
include in their meetings a series of papers on how to improve
the technique of the lawyer in dealing with human problems.
The result would be increased prestige for the profession.
A third point of view may be expected to develop through
education. At present a divorced individual, with certain ex-
ceptions as to time and person, is free to remarry and start
a new family. The State is willing to issue the license with-
out hesitation. The facts available from this proposed collec-
tion of statistics will show subject to court order, whether or
not a person who has been a member of a family which has
failed is a good risk as a member of a new family. Prospec-
tive spouses of the divorced person, reading the record of the
divorcee's previous family life impartially compiled by disin-
terested experts, will be put on notice. One can only guess
what will be the effect upon spouses of a knowledge that full
disclosure will be required and a permanent record kept.7 9 Yet
chiefly new and needed adjustment to be sought and those who see
chiefly old values that may be imperilled by the changes. Each of the
embattled follows deep truth; none grasps fully how much truth the
other foots on; the development of objectives is emotion-bound, purblind,
draws more on instinct than on eye." Id.
79The recording of statistics in connection with divorce cases may bejustified both as an aid to the State and a deterrent to the individual
parties involved. The State may use such material as a basis for a
scientific study of the problem leading to preventive action in accordance
with the analogy supplied by the medical profession in tracing down
disease. The court may also find it of value to gather the facts in
specific cases so that the decrees of the court may be justified not
merely as a matter of history and logic, but in accordance with the best
modern sociological principles.
The gathering of statistics, because they are impersonal, should not
affect in any way the individuals involved. The gathering of the facts
in specific cases, however, may be the subject of considerable discussion.
On the one hand, it may be urged that family affairs are of such a
personal nature that it is contrary to the public morals to have them
spread out on a public record where everyone may see. On the other
hand, it is argued that if certain people see them, definite benfit may
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it is arguable that a State may justifiably classify its citizens
into three groups, those who have made a fair success in mar-
riage, those who have failed, and those whose status is unde-
termined.
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL
The ordinary objections to a proposal of this sort attack the
novelty, the danger in establishing a precedent of the law co-
operating with the other social sciences, the expense and simi-
lar matters. Two questions for brief consideration here are:
Is the proposal legally possible? Is it socially wise? As to the
suggestion to make divorce a matter of judicial discretion, it
may be said: Divorce in this country from the beginning has
been a creature of statute." Laws affecting divorce and mar-
riage have been attacked unsuccessfully as violating the con-
stitutional provisions against the impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts.8 1 Judicial discretion over annulment is
granted by the New York legislature. 82 The English discre-
tionary system has already been referred to.83 It would seem
to follow that there is no constitutional objection to making
divorce a matter of grace.
The establishment of an administrative agency to aid the
court in the disposition of extra-legal problems would also
seem constitutionally unobjectionable. Administrative tribu-
nals are now functioning, and a reasonably expert draughts-
man should be able, in writing the statute proposed here, to
evade such pitfalls as deprivation of the right to a day in
be accomplished. In cases where unwarranted accusations are made by
one spouse against the other a record of the truth should be very
valuable and might possibly bring about actions for libel, slander, and
perjury. All this would tend to clarify divorce procedure. Again, if
one of the divorced spouses should ever plan to marry a third person,
that third person might conceivably benefit from reading the record of
the divorce and thereby ascertaining what sort of a family situation he
was acquiring. In general, it would seem that the arguments in favor
of recording the facts of specific cases and making them available to
certain persons in the discretion of the court would be a better plan
than an effort at complete secrecy.8 0
"Jurisdiction to grant divorce is wholly statutory in the United
States ... hence until statutes or constitutional provisions granted power
to decree divorces, the sole recourse of dissatisfied married persons was
to petition the legislature for a dissolution of the marital bond, or to
seek an annulment." Vernier, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 98, § 81.8 1That marriage is not considered a contract within the meaning of
the impairment of contracts clause of the Federal Constitution has been
undoubted since Marshall's famous dictum in the case of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 627, 4 L. Ed. 629 (U. S. 1819).8 2See, for example, 14 N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930) § 7.83See supra note 12.
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court, trial by jury and due process of law, and the use of
expert witnesses. 4 The addition of jurisdiction to an existing
court or the combination of two courts would seem within
the power of the legislature,85 although an exception might
arise in South Carolina, where by constitutional mandate, no
divorces are granted.86 Therefore, it appears that the proposal
is legally possible.
The social wisdom of the proposal is predicated upon the
adoption by the observer of certain assumptions. Today there
is honest disagreement upon such fundamentals as whether
the family has a social value worth protection by the State;
whether the State should be given the right to interfere with
the individual in his marriage;87 whether money and time
spent in efforts at family rehabilitation are justified; s8
whether the public will stand for family regimentation. 9 The
8 4
"The interpretation and application of modern social and economic
legislation has raised difficult problems for the court . . . Specialized
knowledge is equally necessary in dealing with problems arising under
laws regulating workmen's compensation; public health; ... production
and sale of foods, etc... such functions can perhaps be best performed
by administrative bodies." Aumann, The Change in Relationship of
the Judicial and Executive Branches, 22 Ky. L. Jour. 246, 251 (1934).
See also Pound, Constitutional Aspects of American Administrative Law,
9 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 409 (1923); Satterfield, A Discussion of the
Extent to which the Constitution of the United States Authorizes a
Judicial Review of the Decisions of Administrative Tribunals, 4 Miss.
L. Jour. 184 (1932); Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitu-
tion, 23 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23 (1929).8 5 Several States seem to have found difficulties with constitutional
obstacles. Waite, Courts of Domestic Relations, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 161
(1921). But these obstacles are not insurmountable. "As a matter of
constitutional law there is no Federal requirement that the executive,
legislative and judicial functions of the states be kept separate. The
various state constitutions generally provide for a separation of func-
tion, but there is no clear legal demarcation and the question is generally
one of policy rather than one of law." United States Department of
Labor, Children's Bureau, Bulletin #193 (1929) 20.
80S. C. Const., Art. 17, § 3.8TCf. Lichtenberger, op. cit. supra note 33, at p. 298. "As touching the
rate of divorce, the influence of individualism results in a strong ten-
dency to resort to marriage relations which promote individual welfare.
When the union proves unfavorable in this regard there is destined to
be facile and free recourse to the divorce courts. Divorce laws may
remain unchanged; they may become even more stringent; legal sanc-
tions may be backed up by specific group prejudices, but the divorce
rate from this cause will tend to rise until conditions in marriage be-
come more favorable to this end." Id.8 8
"There are still many whose conceptions of the family do not go
beyond the legal and institutional aspects of relations between husband
and wife." Mowrer, Domestic Discord (1928) 25. See also Reeves v.
Reeves, 203 N. C. 792, 167 S. E. 129 (1933), where the court, dealing
with a statute which allowed either party to sue for divorce after five
years separation, read into the statute certain limitations that prevented
the legally guilty party from securing a divorce.8 9See Brearly, A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinians,
2 Law and Contemporary Problems 329 (1935).
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present writer assumes tentatively an affirmative answer to
these questions and argues that, therefore, machinery should
be set up to provide the facts. With them it will also be pos-
sible to set up remedial machinery and clarify the viewpoint
of the state.
Fundamentally, the change in the point of view of the
court from an instrument of punishing sin, assessing dam-
ages, and castigating criminals, to an institution for the re-
habilitation of the family, should in time encourage people to
bring their family troubles voluntarily to the tribunal for
solution long before they reach the breaking point. Physi-
cians, public health officials and insurance associations for
years have been educating the public to appreciate the im-
portance of preventive medicine. Preventive legal processes
are not doomed ab initio to public disapproval. The time may
even come when the members of a family group may volun-
tarily entrust the solution of their mutual problems to a group
of experts who have gained public confidence. By setting
up the proposed machinery material will be made available
for the educational process.
CONCLUSION
The present article has considered family dissolution and
the effect upon it of existing legal procedure. As an example
a specific rule of law has been chosen-the one requiring that
the plaintiff in divorce proceedings be legally innocent. It
has been urged that the particular rule serves no purpose that
may not be better served by improved legal techniques in
dealing with human problems. Proposals have been made as
to the nature and operation of the machinery to support those
improved legal techniques. Objections to those proposals
have been considered. It is true the proposals are much broad-
er than the application of the specific example, but they were
necessarily involved. From the foregoing discussion, it is
suggested that the rule of the innocent spouse has long since
outlived its social usefulness, if in fact it ever had any, and
that the time is at hand to substitute for this outmoded rule
and its accompanying procedure a more efficient and satisfac-
tory system of control of familial relations.
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